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Abstract: 
In this paper we draw upon relevant theory of auctions to show that information exchange
among firms that leads to an agreed schedule of prices may not be price fixing, and may
enhance welfare. A case is described in which per se illegal communication among industry
players that produced such agreements enhanced welfare. In the circumstances of the case
communication substituted for information exchange that would have been provided by a
forward market that was too costly to establish. The results are in accord with a growing body of
literature that suggests that per se illegality under competition law should be used very
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1. Introduction
In many countries price fixing is illegal per se. It is not necessary for a complainant to show that
the conduct in question had an inefficient effect in order to establish a breach of competition
law.  However, recent literature suggests that co-ordinated acts, including price collusion, can
improve welfare (see for example Fershtman and Pakes, 2000, and Groenewegen, 1994). These
findings pose the question of whether rule of reason should not be confined to penalty in these
cases, but perhaps extended to the co-ordinated acts themselves.
In this paper we suggest a particular, different reason why information exchange about prices
may be efficient. Information exchange between competitors may act as a substitute for a
missing (forward) market. Markets that provide forward contracts of various sorts are markets
where actual and potential market participants implement actions based upon their information
and views about the future. They thus reconcile and reveal information. We argue that,
particularly where this information involves elements of common values, such forward markets
will enhance efficiency. We also argue that in some circumstances – for example, where
transactions costs are relatively high – forward markets may not form, even though their price
discovery process advances efficiency and is in the private interests of participants. In such a
case information exchange even among a subset of (potential) participants may be relatively
economically efficient.
Our empirical work is based upon a particular case involving meatpacking companies in New
Zealand. In this industry there is a great deal of uncertainty about the weekly supply of livestock
at any given price and there is considerable uncertainty about the prices companies will receive
for the processed product. On both sides we argue there are strong common value elements that
are difficult to lay off and yet which affect the procurement price of livestock.
In April 1995, the New Zealaand competition authority (the Commerce Commission) raided the
offices of various meat companies and obtained evidence of “fixed” procurement prices and
regular company meetings that produced these prices. The Commission initiated legal
proceedings against twelve meat companies and some of their senior officers, alleging price
fixing between October 1992 and April 1995.  The litigation was eventually settled, with
penalties totalling $5.5 million being approved by the High Court in August 1998.1
There were a number of intriguing characteristics of the case. First, there were 12 companies
involved which is a very large number to sustain adherence to an agreement (Phlips ch. 2). The
cost structure of these companies was very different, rendering co-ordinated actions very
difficult to enforce (Tirole 2000, 242). Secondly, the fixed price was always the minimum
procurement-transactions price: where the maximum might have been expected under price
fixing that limited the amount companies paid for livestock. Thirdly, despite transactions prices
always exceeding the agreed price, the companies’ livestock managers, and occasionally their
chief executives, met each week without fail to exchange information and fix a price. If the
information exchange was not setting a maximum procurement price, why were the meetings so
important?
These puzzles are explained by the hypothesis that these companies were exchanging
information to mitigate the winners’ curse associated with common value elements in
procurement. In this paper we specify this hypothesis precisely and test it. The evidence of our
empirical work is that livestock suppliers (ie, farmers) were better off under the price fixing that
took place as a consequence of information exchange. Thus, information exchange and agreed
prices were not at the expense of suppliers; and because the price fixing was participated in
voluntarily over time, it was in the interest of the procuring companies. This outcome is not
                                                     
1  The companies acknowledged breaching section 27(1) (but not section 30, which is the specific price fixing section) of the Commerce Act and agreed
to pay certain penalties, ranging between $70,000 and $1.5 million (yielding a total of $5.510 million).  The $1.5 million is the highest individual penalty imposed
what we would expect if the meat companies were successfully colluding. In this case
information exchange entailed mitigation of the winner’s curse and not collusion against
suppliers.
We represent the livestock market by the mechanism of a repeated auction, and we consider that
the findings represent the proposition propounded by Klemperer (2002) that auction design is
not “one size fits all”, rather the outcome of auctions is very institutional and circumstance
specific: the details and context matter.
In the next section we describe the relevant market and in Section 3 we examine the
circumstances, process and outcome of price fixing.  In Section 4 we consider the information
and transactional issues posed by the market.  The interaction between the institutional
characteristics of this case and relevant price discovery features of auctions is used to develop
the hypotheses of this paper in Section 5. The empirical model is developed and implemented to
test hypotheses in Section 6, and Section 7 provides final comments.
2. Institutional Setting
In the livestock market, meat processing companies purchase lambs, sheep and cattle from
farmers.  Most of the resulting meat products are exported and while the use of forward
contracts has since increased, a significant proportion of New Zealand export meat was
processed in anticipation of, and sold at, spot prices in foreign markets over the period of our
analysis (1992-1999). The fact that all companies were exporting a significant fraction of their
product at spot prices meant that they all faced the common value issue for the price of their
product. Most companies, but particularly the larger ones, obtained their product from such a
wide geographic region that they were in the same animal-procurement market.
                                                                                                                                                           
on a defendant under the Commerce Act to date.
Entry barriers have been relatively low since delicensing of entry in 1980, and there has been a
continual stream of entry and exit by processing companies since that time.  Also, the industry
has been adjusting to relative price changes since the complete removal of agricultural subsidies
in 1985, and to technological change in transport and processing.2 Figures A1.1 and A1.2 of
Appendix 1 depict the very active exit and entry of export processing companies and processing
plants throughout the period. In tandem with this industry change, at any time there existed
processing firms of a variety of sizes and cost structures.3 Smaller new plants often had cost
advantages over older and larger plants, in part because of their more rapid adoption of more
flexible labour contracts.4
The structure of the market at a representative point in the relevant period is indicated in Table
A1.3 of Appendix 1. There were approximately 20 processing firms in the industry and 75% of
procurement market shares were held equally by the largest three firms. The number of firms
and the market shares are not suggestive of dominance or of collusive behaviour: particularly
when, as already described, costs varied significantly across companies.
Livestock suppliers are widely and diffusely scattered throughout the geographic market for
procurement.  Communication among them occurred by word of mouth but in insufficient detail
or time to be particularly informative.  While prices being paid in any week would diffuse
through the region the quality of the stock to which they related was not clear.  In fact, prices,
qualities, quantities and players were not observable, at least in a timely manner, because the
bidding meat companies were not all at one geographic location or exchange.  Rather, on any
                                                     
2 New Zealand completely de-regulated agriculture in the three years 1985-88 (see Evans, Grimes and Wilkinson, and Teece (1996) for a review of the
economy-wide reforms that took place in New Zealand over the period 1985-1991)). The withdrawal of subsidies particularly affected the price of sheep relative
to other land uses and the numbers of animals have declined steadily since 1985. However, the production and value added attached to those sheep that have
remained has increased for a variety of reasons to do with increased processing and technological advances.
3 Production of livestock is seasonal, and the processing industry has traditionally had capacity set by demands of the peak season.  In consequence
many plants have high fixed costs (much of which is sunk), that for a portion of the year are typically underutilised and that render profitable vigorous price
competition outside the peak period.
day, a number of transactions occured on a number of farms scattered through the region.  There
was no centralised register of transactions, and because the meat companies purchased some
stock through agents, the quality, speed and reliability of information flowing to companies and
suppliers was limited.5
There were over 20,000 farmers in the region and thus the co-ordination of forward contracts by
competing procurement companies would entail significant transactions costs.  These would
have been compounded by the need to procure on a daily basis and by the price and climatic
uncertainty. The amount farmers supplied at any given price varied significantly through the
year and the region.6  Climatic effects on supply occurred abruptly at times imparting volatility
in what could be procured at a given price. These factors presented the processing companies
with another very uncertain and common factor: the relationship between procurement supply
and price.7
Companies reported that they derived their reservation price for stock by estimating the minimal
value of processed animals to them. This involved estimating the price in foreign markets and
relevant future exchange rates. For each particular type and weight of animal, the company
added the known and estimated prices for each resulting product from that animal to calculate
an estimated gross value. The deduction of estimated costs of processing from gross value,
including a profit margin calculated to achieve a certain rate of return on shareholders’ funds,
yielded the price the company anticipated it could pay up to and not incur losses.  This price
                                                                                                                                                           
4  New labour law introduced in 1991 enabled more flexible labour contracts.
5  The case relates to actions taken before the availability of internet communication and trading services. Widespread use of the internet in New
Zealand, in common with other countries, started to grow rapidly from low levels in 1995 (see Enright (2000)).
6 Farmers rely on pasture growth to feed their animals, and New Zealand’s climate, and hence grass production, is volatile.  Where pasture production
was low (high) livestock would be supplied at lower (high) prices than otherwise.
7 The farmer was generally paid within two weeks of slaughter, while the processing company may not realise all of its returns from an animal until
many weeks later.
was denoted the “schedule”.8 The schedule was calculated by Friday of each week for the
following week. We shall argue that it was affected by risk.
3. Price Fixing
During the period to which the case related, the livestock managers and, occasionally, chief
executive officers of twelve North Island meat companies participated in meetings or
conference telephone calls, generally on a Thursday of each week.  In all, there were about 90
such meetings. During the meetings and conference calls, the companies discussed supply and
demand conditions in foreign output markets, prices in foreign output markets, supply and
demand conditions in the livestock market, prices in the livestock market and profitability of
companies.
The written evidence of the meetings and conference calls contains voluminous references to
livestock market prices (including previous bids and proposed prices and premiums), references
to livestock market capacity and demand conditions, references to livestock market supply
conditions and some references to foreign output market supply conditions, prices, exchange
rates and profitability of companies. The output of this information exchange was typically a list
of prices relating to livestock.9
In many ways the behaviour of the meat companies appears to be consistent with attempted
price fixing.  For example, the records of the case reveal frequent accusations of breach of
alleged price agreements, and threats to initiate price wars.  But several features of the livestock
market imply that collusion might have been quite difficult to sustain.  As we have mentioned,
                                                     
8 Prior to the Commerce Act 1986, there was an agreed national schedule.  However, at the insistence of the Commerce Commission, this practice
stopped in 1987, when each company started to set its own schedule. For a time certain of the processing companies published their schedules. Companies
pay premiums above the schedule price for several particular reasons that include: volume sales, encouraging out of season production, or to maintain farmer
loyalty or for a range of competitive reasons, including inducing supply in non-peak periods when operating below capacity.
company size varied a lot and there were several smaller, lower cost players. Barriers to entry
were low, livestock and output markets volatile and information flows costly and imperfect,
rendering collusive agreements harder to reach, and detection of cheating on agreements more
difficult. Finally, the high fixed costs of processing plants and overcapacity at that time
stemming from a variety of causes, but in part from the adjustments farmers were making to the
removal of price supports, increased the incentive for firms to deviate from any collusive
agreement.
In fact, the actual prices companies paid each week almost invariably exceeded the prices on the
list produced during the meetings and conference calls. Figures A2.1 and A2.2 of Appendix 2
illustrate the differences between the weekly actual prices paid by one of the companies for
bulls and cows and the weekly “agreed” prices.  The distributions for other North Island meat
companies’ prices are similar.
The excess of actual over agreed prices and the repetition of “collusion conferences” at least 90
times, is intriguing.  It meant that the “agreed” prices each week were effectively minimum, not
maximum, prices.   Why would the meat companies repeatedly persist in attempting to fix
prices for so long when it appeared to be a futile exercise?
One reason may be that, even though the actual prices paid were not as low as those agreed,
they were still lower than they would have been in the absence of any discussions.  In other
words, the meat companies were successful to a degree in fixing prices that were lower to
livestock suppliers than they otherwise would be.10 This is a proposition that we test against an
                                                                                                                                                           
9 Genesove and Mullin (2001) analyse notes of the weekly meetings of the Sugar Institute that operated in the United States from 1927 to 1936.  They
argue that the members of the Institute successfully colluded by agreeing not on prices or market shares, but on business rules, which facilitated detection of
secret price cuts.  There is no evidence of such an approach in the present case.
10 Some meat company executives reported that on occasions they believed that the meetings were resulting in lower prices than would otherwise have
been the case.
alternative hypothesis that also fitted the facts: that information exchange mitigated common
value elements of the exchange that benefitted the companies and the livestock suppliers.
4. Price Discovery
In this section we draw on the theory of auctions to explain the connection between the
information exchange by the companies and posit hypotheses as to its likely effect on resultant
procurement prices within the economic environment we have described.
When selling livestock in the spot market, suppliers generally sought bids from competing meat
companies, and accepted the highest one.  In the environment previously described, the
livestock spot market can be characterised as if it were an auction market: in fact, the livestock-
procurement mechanism is probably best described as a mixture of elements of first-price,
sealed-bid auctions, and ascending-bid auctions.  The sealed-bid element reflecting the very
imperfect knowledge of transactors.
The institutional setting described above implies that the livestock auction has both private
value and common value elements:11 The key common value element is the future (export) price
of livestock products.  Each meat company purchases livestock, processed it and sold the
products in the same, or related, mainly international output markets.  While there is some
product and geographical differentiation between companies, it seems reasonable to assume that
there is a high degree of correlation among the companies’ output prices and therefore among
their livestock valuations.   Furthermore, during the period of analysis a significant proportion
of the product was not sold forward and its price was uncertain at the time of livestock purchase.
Private value elements arose for a number of reasons that included the meat processing
                                                     
11 See McAfee and McMillan (1987) for a more complete description of these concepts.
companiesÕ differences in their marketing abilities, product mixes, and costs and contractual
obligations.
We view a companyÕs derived (reservation) livestock price as:
  vi = ri - ci                                                                                                  (1) 
where:
  
vi =  the value of an animal to company i,
ri =  the expected revenue to company i from that animal, and
ci =  the expected costs to company i incurred in processing, transporting and 
       marketing that animal (including a profit margin).
In general, revenue from export had a bigger influence on derived value than did costs.12 Given
that export prices are largely common to all meat companies, and that many costs will also be
common, it seems reasonable to conclude that the common value elements of the livestock
auction dominate the private value elements. Characteristics of auctions enable the effect of
information exchange on bid level to be hypothesised.
 In a common value auction, each bidder makes an estimate of the true value of the item.  In a
symmetric equilibrium, the winning bidder will be the one who receives the highest signal.
Thus winning may convey’s bad news to the winner, because it means that everyone else
estimated the item’s value to be less.  A bidder will win often when the true value is over-
estimated, but only rarely when underestimated.  Consequently, even if the value estimates are
unbiased, they will be systematically high for the winner, thereby engendering the winner’s
                                                     




 ranged between 0.65 and 0.75. Source: Schedule calculations of one company, and discussions with an employee of another company.
curse.13 In short, “Suppose the ith bidder’s information about the item’s true value v can be




E(v xi ) ³ E(v xi ,x i > x j for all j ¹ i)”
(McAfee and McMillan, 1987, page 721). The xi are signals to each bidder about the true value.
The left side of this inequality is the bidder’s expectation about the item’s value before bidding;
the right side shows that person’s expectation after having won. If bidders are rational, they will
mitigate the winner’s curse by discounting their bids: indeed to an extent that varies with the
auction and yields expected revenues that are less than the (expected) common value.14
 John Kagel and Dan Levin (1986) and Kagel (1995) have carried out experimental work with
common value auctions that is informative for the livestock case.  Their simple model is as
follows:15
 
·  The common value v  is drawn randomly from a uniform distribution on the domain (  v,v ).
·  Each bidder receives a signal ix  that is independently drawn from a uniform distribution on
(  v - ,v + ).  A lower  indicates greater signal precision.  As such, the  xi  constitute
unbiased estimates of   v  (or could be used to compute unbiased estimates in conjunction
with the endpoint values   v,v  (Kagel and Levin, 1986)).
For signals from the interval [  v + ,v - ]:
                                                     
13 Models involving both common value and private value elements also include aspects of the winner’s curse (Milgrom (1985)).
14 For examples see Krishna (2002, ch.6).
  
E(v xi ) = xi                                                                                                 
E(v xi ,x i > x j for all j ¹ i) = xi -
n - 1
n + 1
                                                             
 
 where n is the number of bidders. This indicates that the severity of the winner’s curse increases
as the uncertainty – indicated by  - about the true value increases.
The “linkage principle” is also relevant. Intuitively, a bidder’s expected profit from an auction is
greatest when that person holds private information that the item being sold is valuable.16  The
intuition of the linkage principle is that the auctions yielding the highest average prices are those
that are most effective at undermining the privacy of the winning bidder’s information, thereby
transferring some profits from the bidders to the seller. 17  According to the principle, privacy is
undermined by linking price to information other than (but affiliated with) the winning bidder’s
private information.
One application of the linkage principle (due to Milgrom and Weber, 1982a) involves ranking
the different auction forms in terms of expected revenue to the seller.  In an ascending-bid
auction, the equilibrium price depends on the information of losing bidders through the bids
they place.  That linkage is absent in the sealed-bid auction.  Its presence in the ascending-bid
auction leads to a higher predicted price, provided that the bidders’ information is affiliated.
The first-price auction, with no linkages to the other bidders’ estimates, yields the lowest
expected price.18  A key explanation for this result is that, when bidders are uncertain about their
valuations, they can acquire useful information by scrutinising the bidding behaviour of their
competitors during the course of the ascending-bid auction.  That extra information weakens the
                                                                                                                                                           
15 This example satisfies the formal definition of affiliation (Klemperer, 1999).  See Milgrom and Weber (1982a) for a rigorous definition of affiliation, and
Klemperer (1999) for a more informal definition.
16 See Milgrom (1985) and Milgrom (1987).
17 See Krishna (2002, ch.7) for a detailed discussion of the linkage principle.
winner’s curse and leads to more aggressive bidding. The exchange of information by meat
companies may have had this effect.
There are some important distinctions between the version of the ascending-bid auction usually
analysed in the literature (the so-called English version) and the livestock auction.  In an English
auction, the price is continuously raised by an auctioneer, exit is irrevocable, all bidders are in
one spot, and they can all perfectly observe drop out prices.  In the livestock market the
schedule and maximum premium levels are set in isolation (as noted above, this is the first-price
component), and the meat companies “call” the bids, rather than watch the price rise
continuously on an electronic display.  Furthermore, the meat companies are not in one spot and
they act through agents – they accordingly cannot perfectly observe rivals’ behaviour.  Instead
information about rival bids comes from a mixture of direct and indirect sources, reducing its
reliability and speed of transfer among market participants.
For all of these reasons, one would expect the livestock price discovery mechanism to be less
effective at mitigating the winner’s curse than an English auction.19 In these circumstances,
auction theory predicts that the meat companies will discount their estimates of value to account
for the winner’s curse.
Following Kagel and Levin op cit  the severity of the winner’s curse increases as the uncertainty
about the true value increases.  If information exchange increases signal precision (that is,
reduces ), the winner’s curse will be mitigated, and bids will be higher for any given signal
(  xi ) of the common value.
                                                                                                                                                           
18 The second-price auction falls in between.  Note that Bikhchandani and Riley (1991) show that the ascending-bid auction can yield lower expected
revenue than the second-price auction if asymmetric equilibria are also considered.  Furthermore, Perry and Reny (1999) show that the linkage principle does
not generally hold in multiunit auctions.
19 See Harstad and Rothkopf (1998) for support of this argument.
Similar ideas have been examined in other models.  For example, DeBrock and Smith (1983)
consider the information pooling effects of joint bidding for offshore petroleum tracts in the
USA.  Joint bidding reduces the number of bidders.  However, it also pools estimates of true
value which changes the information structure of the auction.  DeBrock and Smith show that the
variation of the joint venture’s estimating process varies inversely with the number of members.
Consequently, larger joint ventures are better able to estimate the true value and bid more
aggressively.  Allocative efficiency also improves.
Krishna and Morgan (1997) also analyse the efficiency of information sharing between joint
bidders in auctions.  They compare the equilibrium bidding behaviour of individual bidders with
that of symmetric bidding groups.   They find that symmetric joint bidding groups bid more
aggressively than individual bidders.  There are two effects causing this.  The first is the
information pooling effect of DeBrock and Smith (1983).  The second results from the fact that
the expected value of exceeding all other pooled signals is greater than the expected value of
exceeding all of the signals individually.  This results in a mitigation of the winner’s curse,
leading the winning bidder to be more optimistic about the value of the object.  Krishna and
Morgan point out that this “information” effect is the result of inferences drawn from the
pooling of other bidders’ information.  Pooling and inference each raise the level of bids.
Assuming for the moment that firms tell the truth, this literature implies that information
exchanges that entail pooling and inference among bidders should result in higher common
value auction prices.  There are also additional results in auction theory that suggest reducing
informational asymmetries among bidders results in higher expected revenues to the seller (see,
for example, Milgrom and Weber 1982b).
We now consider whether or not the companies would reveal truthful information in their
exchanges and the implications of revelation for what has been observed.. The auction literature
does not address the issue of the incentives on bidders (particularly better informed ones) to
misinform others about their private information.   More generally, this literature does not
specifically address the incentives of bidders to exchange information.  There is an oligopoly
literature on information exchange, but this also has generally assumed that firms will truthfully
reveal their private information (Vives, 1990).
If truth-telling is relaxed, information exchanges may still reduce uncertainty and therefore
result in higher prices.  For example, analysis based on Hausch (1988) in the context of repeated
auctions may explain why the companies appeared to exchange, or “agree” on, a minimum
price.  In particular, the game played in week t can be thought of as consisting of two stages.  In
the first stage, after receiving its signal about the “true value”, each company determines what
information it will release.  In the second stage, after the information exchange, each company
determines its bid.  The “information release” strategy and the bidding strategy of each
company will both be functions of its true signal; the bidding strategy will also be a function of
the information learned from the exchange.  In the first stage, each company has an incentive to
understate its true signal; a company would do this in order to try to persuade its rivals to bid
low, so that the “deceiver” can outbid them and gain market share.   However, all companies
would understand this incentive, or would at least learn about it quickly, and would therefore
adjust the signals they receive from each other upwards in equilibrium.
Hausch (1988) assumed that bidding strategies are invertible.  Under this assumption all meat
companies can deduce each other’s true signal.  While this lack of deception may appear
paradoxical, Hausch’s explanation can also be applied to the present circumstances; as the
incentive for deception exists, a player who releases their actual signal knows the other players
will overestimate the player’s type and will be ‘overcompetitive’ in the second stage.
Accordingly, the information released by each player will reduce uncertainty, mitigating the
winner’s curse, and leading to more aggressive bidding.20
Given the incentive to deceive, companies exchanging signals that each knows will be the
minimum price is possibly a more credible, and therefore sustainable, information exchange
mechanism than one involving some other descriptor of the location of the distribution of bids.
For example, agreeing on the maximum bid is most unlikely to yield a credible descriptor in the
competitive environment of procurement.
In sum, in the circumstance of the companies, auction theory suggests a number of reasons why
information exchange may have precipitated more aggressive bidding and thereby more
efficient price discovery. The desire to reach credible and useful agreement may have led the
companies to agree on a location of the distribution of prices given by the minimum.
5 The Model
In the absence of information exchange between the meat companies, auction theory predicts
that:21
  v > p                                                                                                      (1)
where:
                                                     
20 The one-shot game analysed above is repeated each week by the meat companies, with an infinite horizon.  This repetition is unlikely to affect the
conclusions because the meat companies are likely to have had relatively small discount factors during the relevant period (ie, they were relatively impatient),
because of the uncertain dynamically changing industry of the time.
21 If bids are discounted in accordance with rational equilibrium bidding, the winning bid will on average be below the items’s true but unknown value
(McAfee and McMillan, 1998).
  
v      is  the "reservation value" of an animal (described in (1) above as being essentially the 
        revenue from that animal less the costs incurred in producing that revenue, including
        a specified profit margin), and
  p      is the price of an animal, set by the highest bid.
The winner’s curse is a function of uncertainty.  Accordingly, if information exchange between
the meat companies reduces uncertainty, the winner’s curse will be reduced, the meat
companies will bid more aggressively, and the livestock price will be higher.  This prediction is
the opposite of what we would expect to observe if the meat companies were colluding
effectively to lower prices to suppliers.  The hypothesis can be described as follows:
  v > p
ie > pnie > p c                                                                             
where:
  
p ie  is the price of an animal (set by the highest bid) with information exchange,
pnie is  the price of an animal (set by the highest bid) with no information exchange, and
pc   is the price of an animal (set by the highest bid) with successful collusion.
The livestock price will be higher when the meat companies exchange information than when
they do not, holding everything else, including the derived value, constant.
A secondary hypothesis is that the variance of the livestock price is lower when the meat
companies exchange information than when they do not.  Intuitively, exchange of estimates
should improve the ability of companies to identify whether or not their signal is an outlier, and
thereby adjust their bid.22
To formalise these hypotheses equation:
  p
b = + v + X + Z +                                                                (2)
is posited, where:
  p
b  is  the firm's bid price (for period t + 1),
  
v= r -c (as in (1)) is the firm's estimate of the value of an animal in 
        period t + 1, set in period t. It is the reservation value of the 
       firm set by a company on the basis of its private information,
  
r     is  the estimated revenue from the output produced from that animal (based on public
       information and the firm's own private information about demand and supply
       conditions in the output markets),
  
c     is  the estimated costs of processing, transporting and marketing that animal
       (based on the firm's own private information about its costs),
  
X    is public information about demand and supply conditions in the 
       livestock market in period t + 1,and
  
Z    is private information held by other firms in period t about demand and 
      supply conditions in the livestock and output markets, and other
      relevant matters (for example, the financial position of other firms)  
      in period t + 1.
The parameter  is known to the firm, but Z is only known to it with information exchange (Z
is assumed to be independent of v and X).
                                                     
22 See Mellsop (2001) for a formalisation.
Equation 2 applies whether or not there is information exchange between the meat companies.
With information exchange, the bid price is   p
b v,X,Z .  Without information exchange, it is
  p
b v,X . In both cases, the econometrician does not see Z and estimates:
  p
b = + v + X + u                                                                          (3)
where   u = + Z . Using this model we express our hypotheses as:









Hypothesis 1 states that the coefficient of variation23 of the livestock price when there is
information exchange will be lower than when there is no information exchange.  With
information exchange,   p
b is conditioned on  the additional information Z, while in the absence
of information exchange, Z forms part of the error term.  Note that we might also expect this
result if the meat companies were colluding to lower procurement prices.
Hypothesis 2 is a formalisation of the argument that the livestock price will be higher with
information exchange than without it, as discussed above.  This hypothesis is inconsistent with
collusion.  It is a specialisation of *  and * ££ , where * denotes the information
exchange period.  We examine this more general specification by checking whether *=
                                                     
23 The coefficient of variation is used, rather than the variance, to control for the different scale of the variable between the information and non-
information exchange periods. Note that our hypothesis applies the unconditional variances which we shall use for this aspect of the test.
and *<  in our specification tests. While Hypothesis 2 is met by either (a) * >  and
* =  or (b) * =  and * > , they have quite different implications.  In both cases the
price paid to farmers will be higher under information exchange, but in case (b) volatility in bid
price due to volatility in this valuation will be higher than if (a) obtained.
6. Empirical Analysis
The following econometric specification of the model (2) was implemented:24
  pt
b = At + dI t + pt
o + ut                                                                      (4)
where:
             At    includes the intercept term, all of the dummy variable terms
25 except   4I t, a trend
26,
                   and a term controlling for rainfall. These terms represent the elements of X and c of
                   our basic specification (2),
            d = * -  is the increment in bid price, resulting from information exchange,
  pt
b   is  the livestock bid price in week t,
  pt
O   is  the indicator (output) company gross value for week t calculated by the company, and 
  
I t    =   1 if week t falls before the end of the information exchange period (6 April 1995)
        =   0 otherwise.
                                                     
24 See Mellsop (2001) for the full specification.
25 The dummy variables of At are described in Appendix 1.
26 A trend variable was used as a surrogate for changes in processing costs, which have fallen steadily since deregulation in 1980.
The data are described in more detail in Appendices 3 and 4. The variable   p
b in Equation 3 is
the ex post, average, winning bid price (each week or month).  This data is a proxy for the bid
price determined in week t for week t+1 (in accordance with Equation 1). The variable   p
o is
our measure of the gross value – the element r - of  v, and c is captured by variables in A that
describe the path of costs over time.27 These are provided in more detail in Appendix 3.
The data have come from two sources.  A North Island meat company (Company A) that was
involved in the information exchanges supplied 2 sets of beef and one set of lamb data. The
Meat and Wool Economic Service of New Zealand (MWES) supplied beef data. Thus there
were four usable series in total. We describe our approach for Company A’s beef data only.28
Analysis of the other series followed the same procedure.
Company A supplied the following (weekly) beef time series data for the period commencing 4
October 1992 through to the week ending 29 May 1999 (a total of 346 observations):
·  The average price the company paid each week for bull (category 295/320) and cow
(category 170/195), in cents per kilogram and exclusive of levies and transport costs (  pt
b in
Equation 4); and
·  The processed Bull and Cow prices it used each week in the schedule setting process, in
New Zealand cents per kilogram (FOB) (  pt
o in Equation 4).29
                                                     
27 It was not possible to calculate c directly because it depends upon company choices about pricing in relation to marginal or average cost and cost
information that was not available. It is incorporated by including variables that allow for changes in costs over time.
28 For more details about the data see Appendix 4.
29 Because these are the figures used by Company A in the schedule setting process, the livestock price in week t can be regressed against the
indicator price given for week t; there is no need for any lag.  There would be a need for a lag, for example, if the indicator prices given for week t were ex post
realisations.
Given out time series of data, a key issue for estimation concerns the presence or absence of
nonstationarity. According to standard tests, the price data were nonstationary.  The span of the
data is so short that there is reason to be quite uncertain about this conclusion.  Nevertheless, the
price data are in nominal terms and nonstationarity is a possibility.  Tests of non-stationarity,
and the implications of any nonstationarity for the results, were studied in detail.  The
investigation indicated that treating the empirical findings as if the price data are stationary does
not affect the interpretation of the key statistics, although it does the specification of the model
for estimation.30
Hypothesis 1 – comparison of coefficients of variation
To test Hypothesis 1, the bull and cow price time series were split into two parts: the
information exchange period (being the first 130 observations), and the period after the
Commerce Commission raid (being the final 216 observations).  Tables 1 to 4 set out relevant
statistics for the Company A livestock and value indicator data.
In all cases the coefficient of variation of pb is lower in the information exchange period than in
the non-information exchange period which is in accord with Hypothesis 1.  Furthermore, this
occurs despite the fact that the coefficient of variation of po in the first period is somewhat
higher than in the second period.
The same qualitative findings were obtained for Company A lamb data, and for MWES beef
data. Thus all four data series are in accord with Hypothesis 1.
                                                     
30 See Mellsop (2001) for details.  Very briefly, Phillips-Perron tests implied that the equations were cointegrated.  Accepting this, the equations were re-
estimated allowing for serial correlation in the disturbance term by adding leads and lags of the indicator price differenced.  The t-statistics of the variables other
than the indicator price then have the standard interpretation, and in each equation the conclusions remained unaffected.  The t-statistic on the cointegrating
coefficient on the indicator price in each equation retains its interpretation because the Newey and West variance estimator has been used.
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pb 216 160.94 29.91 894.34 0.186
po 216 250.80 31.34 982.05 0.125
Hypothesis 2 – impact of information exchange on mean livestock price
The model that we estimated allowed both  and  of our model to vary between the
information exchange and nonexchange periods in the following way.
  
pt
b = At + dIt + pt
o + I t pt
o + ut                                                                    (5.1)
    = At + d + ( + )pt
o + ut        with information exchange    It    =  1            (5.2)
    = At + pt
o + ut                          without information exchange   It  =  0          (5.3)
Diagnostic tests of our estimated model (5) indicated the presence of heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation. In consequence, we used the  Newey and West (1987) estimator of the
covariance matrix of the least squares estimator for autocorrelated disturbances with an
unspecified structure (Greene, 1993).  This estimator is also heteroscedasticity-consistent
(Kennedy, 1992).  The desirable number of lags for this procedure were checked in various
ways.31 Lags of 1 and 6 for bull, and 1, 3 and 7 lags for cow met the specification tests,
however, the results for each of these regressions were very similar, and accordingly only those
for 6 lags for bull, and 3 lags for cow, are reported (see Table 5). They are robust against
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Furthermore, the qualitative results that follow are
unaffected by changing the specification to a log-linear functional form.
Table 5: Company A: bull and cow Model (using the Newey and West procedure
with 6 lags for bull and 3 for cow)
Parameters
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
d
Estimate t-value
Bull 0.52 5.52 -0.19 -1.37 79.07 2.09
Cow 0.46 7.00 -0.10 -1.22 47.09 2.11
                                                     
31  The process followed is described in Mellsop (2001).
The results reported in Table 5 imply that the coefficient b  is positive and statistically
significant. They support the hypothesis that = 0 and hence that  does not change between
the information exchange and non-exchange periods. The information dummy coefficient, d ,
then captures the model’s difference between the two periods. It is positive and statistically
significant implying that procurement prices were relatively higher in the information exchange
period.  These results are squarely in accord with Hypothesis 2.
The econometric results for the MWES beef data reported in Mellsop (2001) also support
Hypothesis 2.  The econometric results for the Company A lamb data support Hypothesis 1 –
that the variance in prices paid was lower in the information exchange period: however, they are
not in accord with Hypothesis 2 (see Mellsop (2001 p. 167). However, the data for lamb are
much more problematic for a test of this hypothesis than is the data for beef. The Company’s
indicator of value for the lamb analysis is not nearly as comprehensively representative of
company total animal revenue as that available and used for the beef analysis, and the
processing treatment of lamb was changing in a way that was transforming a commodity
product into a higher value-added product, and this change would have had the effect on the
results that Mellsop (2001, p.167) reports.32  We include the lamb results for completeness, but
we do not consider them to be nearly as informative about our hypotheses as the three sets of
beef results.
7. Concluding Comment
The results indicate that during the information exchange period the volatitility in prices was
lower than when information exchange was prohibited. Furthermore, controlling for internal
assessments of the value of the final product to companies, the evidence is that companies paid
more for livestock in the information exchange period. The evidence is that the agreed prices set
in the regular meetings were minimum transaction prices, not the maxima that might have been
expected under price fixing. These facts and the volatile dynamic industry in which these events
took place suggest that  the regular company meetings were discovering information that is
likely to have had the effect of mitigating the winner’s curse.
Given that the added security afforded by information exchange improved prices to suppliers
and that it was voluntarily chosen by the companies, efficiency gains from trade attended the
information exchange for which the companies were prosecuted.  If, as seems to have been the
case, these gains arose from the resolution of the winner’s curse, why for these repeated
transactions would not some institutional arrangement, such as a forward market, arise that had
the same effect?  We consider that the transactions costs in forming such a market given the
informational and locational characteristics – particularly the separate scattered nature of one
side of the market, the need to verify quality and the costs of goods exchanged – may have
outweighed the gains from trade that it would imply. However, the potential for much lower-
cost information exchange exists now under internet technologies and long-term quality-
adjusted risk-sharing contracts are becoming more common in the industry.
In common with the competition law of many countries, under the New Zealand Commerce Act
it is not necessary to show that the conduct in question had an inefficient effect in order to
establish a breach of the price fixing provision (section 30).  The rationale for using such a per
se approach is that it economises on the costs of monitoring and enforcing antitrust laws, and it
provides a clear statement of the law, arguably reducing uncertainty.  However, the evidence of
this research is that, in an auction market characterised by common value elements and
significant uncertainty, co-ordination between competitors can be welfare enhancing. Indeed
                                                                                                                                                           
32 Over the period lamb markets and the extent to which processing was taken to the point of chilled cuts – as opposed to frozen carcasses – increased
dramatically. Our indicator did not relate to the higher valued chilled product.
such information exchange is an activity of forward markets.  Fershtman and Pakes (2000) and
Groenewegen (1994) also suggest that collusion can raise welfare.  Accordingly, the
disadvantage of the per se approach is that it can prohibit potentially efficient arrangements.
This research suggests that per se offences should be specified very sparingly indeed.
It may be conceptually difficult to distinguish price fixing from the ordinary behaviour of
forward markets where prices reflect existing information, expectations of the future and past
behaviour.  Gains from trade should not be threatened by rigid rules specified by competition
law.
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Appendix 1: Indicators of the State of the Market
Figure A1.1
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Figure A1.2
























Plants Opened Plants Closed
Table A1.3: Procurement Market Shares: 1994
Company Sheep (%) Beef (%)
AFFCO (cooperative company) 25.0 30.0
Weddel (private company) 26.9 18.4
Richmond (public unlisted company) 22.7 9.9
Lowe Walker (private company) 6.0 20.5
Benmore (private company) 0.0 5.0
Others (about 15) 19.4 16.2
100.0 100.0
Source: Calder and Tyson  (1999).
 Appendix 2: The “Agreed” Price was a Price Floor
Figure A2.1
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Appendix 3: Representing Seasonality, Policy and Industry Change
Dummy variables were used in the econometric specification to represent the following:
·  A change in the quota allocation mechanism in 1995.  Certain key export markets
impose quantitative restrictions on imports of New Zealand meat.  The mechanism for
allocating this quota among meat companies was changed on 1 January 1995, as the
previous mechanism was felt to provide an extra incentive to procure market share,
resulting in higher livestock prices and possibly overcapacity.
·  Misperceptions about the future quota allocation mechanism, which were perceived to
have caused particularly high livestock prices in July, August and September of 1993.
·  The seasonality of the industry.  In the off-peak season, companies are willing to bid
higher in order to increase their plant throughput.  To capture this effect, twelve dummy
variables were specified, one for each month.
·  Plant capacity and livestock supply changes.  Ideally the model would include variables
measuring capacity and the capital stock of livestock.  However, appropriate data were
not available, and so annual dummy variables were used.  Together with the trend
variable, these should control for systematic effects related to time over the period.
Furthermore, a dummy variable was used for the significant shock to capacity caused by
the collapse of one particularly significant processor in 1994.
Appendix 4: Description of Variables
Dependent variable ( pb)
The variable to be explained is the livestock price, which is set under the auction mechanism by
the winning bid.33
The data for this variable have come from two sources.  The first is a North Island meat
company that was involved in the information exchanges and that we have described as
“Company A”.  Company A supplied both beef and lamb data.
The second source of data is the Meat and Wool Economic Service of New Zealand (MWES).
The MWES collects livestock price data from a number of North Island meat companies, and
supplied beef data for this research.
Each meat company may enter into hundreds of transactions with farmers a week.  The data
used are the average price paid each week (or month in the case of the MWES data) for
particular benchmark livestock classes.  Examples of benchmark livestock classes are bull from
295 to 320 kilograms (“bull 295/320”) and manufacturing cow from 170 to 195 kilograms (“M
cow 170/195”).34
Explanatory variables
A number of variables may influence the livestock price.  The key ones are discussed below.35
Estimated unit revenue:  (po an indicator of v)
As explained above, a key explanatory variable for the livestock price is the estimated price that
the derived products will sell for, particularly in overseas markets.  It is assumed in this research
                                                     
33 Note that the winning bid of a firm in period t+1 might be different to the bid price it set in period t for period t+1 (in accordance with the bidding
decision hypothesised by equation 1).  A firm may be able to purchase livestock at a lower price than it was prepared to pay.  Alternatively, it may be forced by
competition to pay more.
34 Note that the benchmark livestock classes can at times represent very small fractions (eg, less than 10%) of all animals of that class, ie, in a
particular week bull 295/320 may only represent 8% of the total number of bulls processed in that week.
35 See Mellsop (2001, chapter 7) for more detail.
that prices for products in foreign markets are not caused by conditions in New Zealand for any
company.  While there may be some degree of market power on occasions (from product
differentiation, for example), the meat companies can probably be broadly characterised as price
takers in their output markets.
Any particular animal can produce numerous saleable products.  For practical reasons, weekly
price data for all of these products could not be obtained for this research.  Instead, prices for
indicator products were used, ie, prices for important products whose price changes broadly
reflect the overall revenue changes from a particular animal.
For example, indicator products for bull 295/320 and M cow 170/195 are:
·  95 CL Bull in the US for bull 295/320 (ie, frozen bulk packed boneless bull meat with a
chemical lean content of greater than 95%); and
·  90 CL Cow in the US for M cow 170/195 (ie, frozen bulk packed boneless cow meat with a
chemical lean content of greater than 90%).
These indicator products constitute a significant proportion of the total boneless meat produced
off the carcase of bull 295/320 and M cow 170/195 respectively.  Their use will mean that
1¹ .
Information exchanges:
The litigation related to the information exchanges between 14 October 1992 and 6 April 1995.
However, from an economic perspective the 14 October date appears to be an arbitrary
boundary.  Accordingly,  the econometric specification uses one dummy variable to split the
time series up into two sections: pre-6 April 1995; and post-6 April 1995.
